Earlier this month, I attended the Spectrum Management Forum 2012 in Munich and was interested to hear several presenters criticise the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) format. The CCA format which has clock and supplementary rounds where bidders bid on indivisible packages of spectrum and where prices paid are determined by a second price rule has in the last few years found increasing favour by many governments for spectrum auctions. Under the second price rule, the price a winner of a particular package pays for its spectrum is determined entirely by competitors’ bids.
A consultancy firm specialising in planning national radio spectrum auctions has criticised Australia’s recent digital dividend spectrum for setting reserve prices too high.
A consultant involved in previous spectrum auctions in India has labelled India’s spectrum policy “a complete shambles”.
Only one of the three spectrum bands supported by the European version of Apple’s iPhone 5 is a European LTE band; a decision described by one industry consultancy as “really odd”.